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Abstract
The expected utility hypothesis and Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle are violated in real life decisions,
as shown by the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes. The popular explanation in terms of ambiguity aver-
sion is not completely accepted. As a consequence, uncertainty is still problematical in economics.
To overcome these difficulties a distinction between risk and ambiguity has been introduced which
depends on the existence of a Kolmogorovian probabilistic structure modeling these uncertainties.
On the other hand, evidence of everyday life suggests that context plays a fundamental role in
human decisions under uncertainty. Moreover, it is well known from physics that any probabilistic
structure modeling contextual interactions between entities structurally needs a non-Kolmogorovian
framework admitting a quantum-like representation. For this reason, we have recently introduced
a notion of contextual risk to mathematically capture situations in which ambiguity occurs. We
prove in this paper that the contextual risk approach can be applied to the Ellsberg paradox, and
elaborate a sphere model within our hidden measurement formalism which reveals that it is the
overall conceptual landscape that is responsible of the disagreement between actual human deci-
sions and the predictions of expected utility theory, which generates the paradox. This result points
to the presence of a quantum conceptual layer in human thought which is superposed to the usually
assumed classical logical layer, and conceptually supports the thesis of several authors suggesting
the presence of quantum structure in economics and decision theory.
1 The Sure-Thing Principle and the Ellsberg Paradox
The expected utility hypothesis requires that in uncertain circumstances individuals choose in such a
way that they maximize the expected value of ‘satisfaction’ or ‘utility’. This hypothesis is the prevailing
model of choice under uncertainty in economics, and is founded on the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility theory [1]. These authors provided a set of ‘reasonable’ axioms under which the expected
utility hypothesis holds. One of the proposed axioms is the independence axiom which expresses
Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle [2]. Examples exist in the literature which show an inconsistency with
the predictions of the expected utility hypothesis, namely a violation of the Sure-Thing Principle.
These deviations are known as Allais [3] and Ellsberg [4] paradoxes. They at first sight indicate the
existence of an ambiguity aversion, that is, individuals prefer ‘sure’ over ‘uncertain’ choices. Several
approaches have been forwarded to explain the deviations predicted by these paradoxes but none of
them is completely satisfying.
Savage introduced the Sure-Thing Principle [2] inspired by the following story.
A businessman contemplates buying a certain piece of property. He considers the outcome of the
next presidential election relevant. So, to clarify the matter to himself, he asks whether he would buy
if he knew that the Democratic candidate were going to win, and decides that he would. Similarly,
he considers whether he would buy if he knew that the Republican candidate were going to win, and
1
ar
X
iv
:1
30
1.
07
51
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  4
 Ja
n 2
01
3
again finds that he would. Seeing that he would buy in either event, he decides that he should buy,
even though he does not know which event obtains, or will obtain, as we would ordinarily say.
The Sure-Thing Principle is equivalent to the assumption that, if persons are indifferent in choosing
between simple lotteries L1 and L2, they will also be indifferent in choosing between L1 mixed with
an arbitrary simple lottery L3 with probability p and L2 mixed with L3 with the same probability p
(independence axiom).
Let us now consider the situation proposed by Daniel Ellsberg [4] to point out an inconsistency
with the predictions of the expected utility hypothesis and a violation of the Sure-Thing Principle. An
urn contains 30 red balls and 60 balls that are either black or yellow, the latter in unknown proportion.
One ball is to be drawn at random from the urn. To ‘bet on red’ means that you will receive a prize a
(say, 100 $) if you draw a red ball (‘if red occurs’) and a smaller amount b (say, 0 $) if you do not. Test
subjects are given four options: (i) ‘a bet on red’, (ii) ‘a bet on black’, (iii) ‘a bet on red or yellow’,
(iv) ‘a bet on black or yellow’, and are then presented with the choice between (i) and (ii), and the
choice between (iii) and (iv). A very frequent pattern of response is that (i) is preferred to (ii), and
(iv) is preferred to (iii). This violates the Sure-Thing Principle, which requires the ordering of (i) to
(ii) to be preserved in (iii) and (iv).
The contradiction above suggests that preferences of real life subjects are inconsistent with the
Sure-Thing Principle. A possible explanation of this difficulty could be that people make a mistake
in their choice and that the paradox is caused by an error of reasoning. We have recently studied
these paradoxes, together with the existing attempts to solve them, and we instead maintain that the
violation of the Sure-Thing Principle is not due to an error of reasoning but, rather, to a different
type of reasoning. This reasoning is not only guided by logic but also by conceptual thinking which is
structurally related to quantum mechanics [5, 6].1 In particular, we have performed in [9] a test of the
Ellsberg paradox on a sample of real subjects. We have also asked them to explain the motivations
of their choices. As a consequence of their answers, we have identified some conceptual landscapes
(physical, optimistic, pessimistic, suspicion, etc.) that act as decision contexts surrounding the decision
situation and influencing the subjects’ choices in the Ellsberg paradox situation. We refer to [9] for
a complete analysis of these landscapes. We instead observe, as a consequence of our analysis, that
it is the combined effect of all landscapes that is responsible, together with ambiguity aversion, of
the experimental results collected since Ellsberg, hence of the deviations from classically expected
behavior. Then, the presence of these contextual effects entails that a quantum or, better, quantum-
like, formalism is needed to model the Ellsberg situation at a statistical level [9]. This insight will be
deepened and improved in the next sections, but we first need to introduce the notion of contextual
risk.
1It should be stressed that in the simple situation considered by Ellsberg it can be argued that there is a real error
of reasoning, since the probabilities can be estimated if some simple additional hypothesis about the distribution of the
balls are made. We consider that the root of the Ellsberg paradox is however not an error of reasoning, but rather
a different type of reasoning which is present next to classical logical reasoning, for we look at the Ellsberg situation
as a metaphorical example of archetypical equivalent and more complex situations appearing in real life. Even for the
Ellsberg situation in its concrete form, one could hesitate about the fact that it is always the same number of yellow
balls. For such a concrete similar situation in real life that has been studied explicitly we refer to the disjunction effect,
for example in the form of the Hawaii problem [7, 8]. As we analyze it, the root there is not an error of reasoning, but a
different nonclassical type of reasoning. Moreover, this quantum conceptual reasoning constitutes an essential aspect of
human reasoning equally important than the aspect of human reasoning where classical logic applies.
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2 Contextual risk and the hidden measurement formalism
Contextual risk has been formally introduced by two of us in [10, 11] to mathematically represent
those statistical situations occurring in economics which strongly depend on context and cannot be
associated with a Kolmogorovian probability model [12]. Let us resume the essentials of contextual
risk in the following.
Frank Knight introduced a distinction between the different kinds of uncertainty occurring in
economics [13], and Daniel Ellsberg inquired into the conceptual differences between them [4]. More
explicitly, Ellsberg put forward the notion of ambiguity as an uncertainty without any well-defined
probability measure modeling this uncertainty, as opposed to risk, where such a probability measure
does exist. The difference between ambiguity and risk can be grasped by considering the situation
introduced by Ellsberg himself. For example, ‘betting on red’ concerns risk, since the probability
involved is known, namely 1/3 to win the bet and 2/3 to loose it. Instead, ‘betting on black’ concerns
ambiguity, since it is only known that the sum of the black and the yellow balls is 60, hence the
number of black balls is not explicitly known.
Ellsberg implicitly considered classical, or Kolmogorovian, probability [12] in his definition of
risk and ambiguity. The research on the foundations of quantum mechanics has meanwhile shown
that classical probability is not the most general conceivable probabilistic framework, since it cannot
model situations where context plays a crucial role. It is worth to be more explicit on this point and
devote some words to it. In classical physics one can construct models which include indeterminism,
e.g., statistical mechanical models. But, this indeterminism only describes the subjective lack of
knowledge about the pure state in which the physical entity has been prepared. Thus, a notion
of statistical, or mixed, state is introduced. The ensuing probability model satisfies the axioms of
Kolmogorov (Kolmogorovian probability). The situation is different in quantum mechanics where the
probability model involved is non-Kolmogorovian [14, 15, 16]. One of the authors has proved that
the non-Kolmogorovian nature of quantum probability can be explained as originating from a lack of
knowledge about how context (in the case of quantum mechanics, measurement context) interacts with
the entity that is considered, i.e. with this explanation the quantum probability is due to the presence
of fluctuations in the interaction between context and entity. This idea has been elaborated and a
hidden measurement formalism has been worked out in which it has been shown that, whenever the
effects of context on a (not necessarily physical) entity can be neither neglected nor predicted, then the
probabilistic framework describing this situation is necessarily non-Kolmogorovian and admits either
a pure (Hilbert space) quantum or a quantum-like representation [17, 18, 19, 20, 21].
Contextual influence frequently appears in situations of risk. Let us consider, for example, the
risk of having an accident. It is evident that if a person is in a context where he (she) is sitting in
a chair reading the newspaper on his (her) terrace, the risk of having an accident is low if compared
with the risk of getting an accident when this person is in the context of sitting in a car next to a
reckless driver. In case ‘risk to have an accident’ is considered with respect to this person, then the
two mentioned contexts will have a different influence on the probabilities describing this risk. Similar
examples can be found in risk management, where one has to identify, monitor and control the external
factors, including accidents, natural causes and disasters, which can potentially affect given financial
operations. For this reason, we have introduced in a recent paper contextual risk to model the context
dependent situations that are described in the economic literature in terms of ambiguity [10, 11]. The
main and pragmatically relevant difference is that the notion of contextual risk can now be endowed
with a probabilistic model. And, better, contextual risk can be recovered within our general hidden
measurement formalism, hence it admits a non-Kolmogorovian quantum-like probability structure.
Let us now explain how the hidden measurement approach can be applied to provide a mathe-
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matical modeling for the notion of contextual risk. Economists are interested in ‘decisions taken by
humans with respect to specific situations’, such as the situation described in the Ellsberg paradox.
In the process of decision making there will generally be a ‘cognitive influence’ having its origin in
the way the mind(s) of the person(s) involved in the decision making relate to the situation that is
the subject of the decision making. The role played in physics by ‘the physical system’ is played in
economics by ‘the considered situation’, the role played in physics by the measurement is played in
economics by the ‘cognitive context’, and the role played in physics by the interaction during the
measurement is played in economics by the decision interaction between mind and situation. The
cognitive context incorporates in principle all types of cognitive aspects that are able to influence the
decision interaction. Quite obviously we generally are in a situation that there is lack of knowledge
about the situation itself, but also lack of knowledge about the decision context and how it interacts
with the situation. This presence of the specific double lack of knowledge is what makes contextual
probability, i.e. the hidden measurement approach, apt for providing a faithful description.
The way in which the hidden measurement formalism can be applied to contextual risk will be
evident in the next section where an explicit hidden measurement model will be constructed for the
Ellsberg paradox.
3 A sphere model for the Ellsberg paradox
We elaborate in this section a macroscopic physical model that reproduces the statistical features of
the decision system considered by Ellsberg. We will see that the sphere model presented here has
a non-Kolmogorovian quantum-like structure, which provides a theoretical support to maintain that
also the Ellsberg system should exhibit the same features [10, 11].
The sphere model consists of a physical entity S that is a material point particle P moving on the
surface of a sphere, denoted by surf , with center O and radius 1. The unit vector v where the particle
is located on surf represents the pure state pv of the entity S (see Fig. 1a). For each point u ∈ surf ,
we introduce the following measurement eu. We consider the diametrically opposite point −u ∈ surf
and install a piece of elastic of 2 units of length such that it is fixed with one of its endpoints in u and
the other endpoint in −u. Once the elastic is installed, the material particle P falls from its original
place v orthogonally onto the elastic, and sticks on it (Fig. 1b). Then the elastic breaks somewhere
and the particle P , attached to one of the two pieces of the elastic (Fig. 1c), moves to one of the two
endpoints u or −u (Fig. 1d). Depending on whether the particle P arrives at u (as in Fig. 1) or at
−u, we attribute the outcome ou1 or ou2 to eu. The elastic installed between u and −u plays the role
of a (measurement) context for the entity S. Let us now consider elastics that break in different ways
depending on their physical construction or on other environmental happenings. We can describe such
a general situation by a classical probability distribution
ρ : [−u, u] −→ [0,+∞] (1)
such that ∫
Ω
ρ(x)dx (2)
is the probability that the elastic breaks in the region Ω ⊂ [−u, u]. We also have:∫
[−u,u]
ρ(x)dx = 1, (3)
which expresses the fact that the elastic always breaks during a measurement. A measurement eu
characterized by a given ρ will be called a ρ-measurement and denoted by euρ in the following. A
ρ-measurement is a hidden measurement for the entity S.
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Figure 1: A representation of the sphere model
Let us calculate the probabilities involved in a ρ-measurement. The transition probabilities that
the particle P arrives at point u (hence the outcome of the measurement is ou1) and −u (hence the
outcome of the measurement is ou2) under the influence of the measurement e
u
ρ , are respectively given
by:
µρ(pu, eu, pv) =
∫ v·u
−1
ρ(x)dx
µρ(p−u, eu, pv) =
∫ 1
v·u
ρ(x)dx. (4)
Let us now come the Ellsberg paradox situation, and consider an urn with 90 balls of different
colors, red, black and yellow. Let us assume that the pure state pv represents a physical situation where
the number of balls is fixed, e.g., 30 red balls, 32 black balls and 28 yellow balls (another pure state
is a physical situation where the number of balls is the same, i.e. 30). Thus, different combinations
of colors correspond to different sectors on the sphere. Then, for each unit vector u ∈ surf , let us
consider the measurement eu representing the decisional situation where the subject is asked to bet
on a given color, red or black, and associate eu with the two outcomes o
u
1 and o
u
2 in such a way that, if
the outcome ou1 (o
u
2) is obtained, this corresponds to the situation where the subject chooses to ‘bet on
red’ (‘bet on black’). Moreover, let us consider different kinds of elastics, characterized by the classical
probability distributions ρ1, ρ2, . . ., one for each conceptual landscape defined in the second section.
The non-uniform distributions reflect the different cognitive aspects of the decisional process. Hence,
the probabilities of ‘betting on red’ and ‘betting on black’ under the conceptual landscape represented
by the classical probability distribution ρj are respectively given by:
µρj (pu, eu, pv) =
∫ v·u
−1
ρj(x)dx
µρj (p−u, eu, pv) =
∫ 1
v·u
ρj(x)dx. (5)
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Till now we have considered only physical situations in which the number of balls was fixed, that
is, the preparation of the balls in the urn was completely known. This situation was reflected by
the fact that the physical state pv of the entity S was a pure state and the point v located on surf .
But we know that in the Ellsberg paradox situation only the number of red balls is known, i.e. 30
balls, while black and yellow balls are in unknown proportion. This situation can be realized in our
sphere model by introducing mixed states and representing them by inner points of the sphere. For
example, if the subject knows that a physical situation associated with the pure state pv is mixed with
a physical situation associated with the pure state p−v (where the point −v ∈ surf is opposed to the
point v) with probabilities s ∈ [0, 1] and (1− s) ∈ [0, 1], respectively, so that the state of the entity is
a mixed state pw, with w = sv + (1 − s)(−v), then the probabilities of ‘betting on red’ and ‘betting
on black’ under the conceptual landscape represented by the classical probability distribution ρj are
respectively given by:
µρj (pu, eu, pw) = s
∫ v·u
−1
ρj(x)dx+ (1− s)
∫ −v·u
−1
ρj(x)dx
µρj (p−u, eu, pw) = s
∫ 1
v·u
ρj(x)dx+ (1− s)
∫ 1
−v·u
ρj(x)dx. (6)
The presentation of the first part of the Ellsberg paradox is thus completed.
It is important to observe that the probabilities in Eqs. (5) and (6) cannot be cast into a unique
Kolmogorovian scheme, which can be proven by referring to Pitowsky’s polytopes, or to Bell-like
inequalities [16]. Furthermore, if we limit ourselves to consider uniform probability distributions
ρj , then the probabilities in Eqs. (5) and (6) become the standard quantum probabilities for spin
measurements, since our sphere model is a model for a spin 1/2 quantum particle [18, 19, 20].
In the model illustrated above we limited ourselves to consider the first part of the Ellsberg paradox,
namely the situation in which a subject is asked to decide between ‘betting on red’ and ‘betting on
black’. A more complex model should be constructed to take into account the whole paradox. We do
not accomplish this task in the present paper, for the sake of lack of space. We instead observe that our
simple sphere model already shows that the Ellsberg example cannot be modeled by using classical
Kolmogorovian probabilities, because of its intrinsic contextuality, and that a non-Kolmogorovian
quantum-like framework is necessary. This result is relevant in our opinion and we devote the next
section to explain and clarify it.
4 Contextual risk and quantum conceptual layer
The notion of contextual risk recently introduced by two of the authors [10, 11] to mathematically
represent ambiguity situations in economics has been applied to the Ellsberg paradox. Within our
hidden measurement formalism a sphere model for the Ellsberg situation has been elaborated which
shows that a unique Kolmogorovian scheme is not suitable to model the experimental situation put
forward by Ellsberg. Moreover, a quantum or quantum-like framework is needed because of the
relevance of context in the form of conceptual landscapes in this situation. The analysis undertaken
in this paper supports the hypothesis that two structured and superposed layers can be identified
in human thought: a classical logical layer, that can be modeled by using a classical Kolmogorovian
probability framework, and a quantum conceptual layer, that can instead be modeled by using the
probabilistic formalism of quantum mechanics. The thought process in the latter layer is given form
under the influence of the totality of the surrounding conceptual landscape, hence context effects are
fundamental in this layer [5, 6].
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We conclude this paper with two remarks on our approach.
(i) The violation of the expected utility hypothesis and the Sure-Thing Principle is not (only) due
to the presence of an ambiguity aversion. We argue instead that the above violation is due to the
concurrence of superposed conceptual landscapes in human minds, of which some might be linked
to ambiguity aversion, but other completely not. We therefore maintain that the violation of the
Sure-Thing Principle should not be considered as a fallacy of human thought, as often claimed in the
literature but, rather, as the proof that real subjects follow a different way of thinking than the one
dictated by classical logic in some specific situations, which is context-dependent.
(ii) An explanation of the violation of the expected utility hypothesis and the Sure-Thing Principle
in terms of quantum probability and quantum interference has already been presented in the literature
[22, 23, 24, 25]. What is new in our approach is the fact that the quantum mechanical modeling is not
only an elegant formal tool but, rather, it reveals the presence of an underlying quantum conceptual
thought. We stress that the presence of a quantum structure in cognition and decision taking does not
presuppose the existence of microscopic quantum processes in human brain. We have indeed avoided
such a compelling assumption in this paper.
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